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1 INTRODUCTION
The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)
2014–2020 of the European Union (EU) is the first
long-term budgetary framework under the Treaty of
Lisbon. A mid-term review/revision is a part of it. In this
review, one of the important decisions is about new own
resources: the introduction of European taxes. The MFF
has been called a political power game among the
budgetary institutions.1 The article answers the
question: what are the chances of the introduction of
new taxes given the results of the power game with the
present MFF? The article starts with stating the MFF as a
fiscal responsibility framework: the logical outcome of
the long-term evolution of the budget. Subsequently, the
most likely results of the institutional power game for
the present MFF will be given: in theory the budget is
curtailed, in practice the cut will probably not
materialize. As a result the chances are high, that at the
mid-term revision, EU taxes will be introduced to
finance the budgetary gap.
2 THE MFF
During the eighties of the last century, the yearly
budgetary negotiations were plagued by stalwart
negotiations between the European Council (Council)
and the European Parliament (EP). Several times the
Parliament rejected the proposed budget. A fundamental
reform of the Community’s budgetary procedure was
required. In 1988, an Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA)
between the Council, European Commission
(Commission) and the EP enabled the two wings of the
budgetary authority to make decisions in advance for a
certain period. Financial perspectives, the predecessors
of the current MFF, setting out the priorities for five to
seven years, were subsequently made. The present MFF
2014–2020 is for a total of EUR 959 billion in spending
commitments (1.03% of total GNI of the Member
States), the so-called ceilings on commitment
appropriations, and 908 in actual payments (0.98% of
GNI), the so-called ceilings on payment appropriations
(both are in 2011 prices).
The present framework2 is the first one based on the
Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force on 1 December
2009. Article 312(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) states that ‘The MFF shall
ensure that the Union expenditure develops in an
orderly manner and within the limits of its own
resources. It shall be established for a period of at least
five years. The annual budget shall comply with the
MFF.’3 The MFF is the framework within whose limits
annual budgets must be agreed. As the Commission,
says, the MFF ‘is not the budget of the EU for seven
years. It is a mechanism for ensuring that EU spending
is predictable and at the same time subject to strict
budgetary discipline’.4 On the basis of political priorities
it defines the maximum amounts available for each
major spending. It is also a political as well as budgetary
framework. Within it the EP and the Council, which are
the Union’s budgetary institutions, have to agree each
year on the budget for the subsequent year.
Before 2009, the MFF’s had no legal basis in the
Treaties. The first financial perspective 1988–1992 was
based on an IIA between the budgetary institutions. The
legal significance, however, was considered to be more
than a simple political commitment. This since the
perspectives had been concluded by institutions that can
enter into legal obligations under the powers conferred
on them by the Treaties. Financial perspectives became
part of the budgetary acquis of the Union and hence EU
budgetary decision-making.5
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The MFF is the constitutional fiscal framework next
to the already existing fiscal rules on a balanced budget
(Article 310) and the limitations on the own resources
(Article 311). It is, to be specific, the so-called MFF
package that every seven years has to be decided on. It
consists of the MFF regulation (MFFR)6 and an IIA.7
Next there are, in the package some declarations on,
e.g., own resources, youth unemployment and a review/
revision of the MFF.8 In sum, in the package the
expenditure side as well as the revenue side has to be
decided.
3 FISCAL RULES
The IMF defines a fiscal rule as a ‘permanent constraint
on fiscal policy through simple numerical limits on
budgetary aggregates’.9 A fiscal rule delineates a
numerical target with a view to guiding fiscal policy, it
specifies a summary operational fiscal indicator and it
can be readily operationalized, communicated and
monitored. 10 Fiscal (budget) rules, however, do also
refer to a wide range of fiscal institutions. ‘Even the
institutions that legislatures use to prepare budgets, and
the structure of committees through which budget
deliberations must proceed, can be viewed as budget
rules.’11 Fiscal rules or, more general, rules-based fiscal
responsibility frameworks can be looked at as a form of
incomplete constitutional contracts: rules that are
designed at the contractual/constitutional level and will
be executed later at the post-constitutional level. 12
The virtue of fiscal rules13 was already heralded by
the Romans: ‘The budget should be balanced, the
treasury should be refilled, public debt should be
reduced.’14 Formal attempts, however, span over the last
century and a half. Three waves of fiscal rules can be
distinguished.15 In the first wave, as of the twenties of
the last century, the so-called golden rule was
prescribed. Subnational governments in federal systems,
e.g., in the US and Switzerland, had to maintain a
current budget balance. In the second wave, after World
War II, industrial countries, e.g., Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands, introduced balanced-budget rules. Most of
them were of the golden rule type. In the third and
current wave, fiscal rules are supported by transparency
standards and appropriate accounting conventions
enshrined in broad legislation (fiscal responsibility law/
act) or international treaty, e.g., in New Zealand, Brazil,
and EU’s Member States.16
The present MFF is part of the third wave. It is the
necessary and logical complement to the long-term
evolution of the goals of the Union. The original goals
were personal freedom and the creation of the one
internal market. Gradually, however, the added goals
became financial redistribution and the supply of
(collective) goods.17 Hence, in the original 1957 Treaty
of Rome only a few budgetary rules were needed.18 In
time, a strong and transparent financial framework was
needed – if only to curtail the yearly quarrels.19 Because
of the evolution in the goals it was no longer sufficient to
adapt the existing rules: an institutional-constitutional
reform was needed. The existing informal financial
perspective lost its claim to efficiency and legitimacy. 20
These broader reforms are important in view of the
effects of fiscal rules on creative accounting.21 At one
extreme, the ‘institutional irrelevance view’ holds ‘that
budget rules can be circumvented by modifying
accounting practices and changing the nominal timing
or other classification of taxes and expenditures’.22 On
the other hand, empirical studies23 suggest that fiscal
6 Council (2013) supra n. 2.
7 That IIA contains some residual aspects that were originally in the
financial perspectives (the old IIA), but were not included in the
MFF. European Council, Inter-institutional agreements European
Parliament, Council, European Commission, Inter-institutional
Agreement of 2 Dec. 2013, Official J. of the Eur. Union C 373/1
(2013).
8 European Commission, supra.
9 International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Rules – Anchoring
Expectations for Sustainable Public Finances. 16 Dec. (2009).
10 Cp. L. Schuknecht, EU fiscal rules. Issues and lessons form
political economy (European Central Bank, Working Paper Series,
No. 421/December 2004); X. Debrun, et al., Tied to the Mast?
National Fiscal Rules in the European Union, Economic Policy
(April 2008), 299–362.
11 J.M. Poterba, Do Budget Rules Work? National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper 5550 (1996); Cp. P. Becker,
Fortschreibung des Status Quo – Die EU und ihr neuer
Finanzrahmen Agenda 2007 (Integration 2 2006).
12 J. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan
(Liberty Fund, Indianapolis [1975] 2000).
13 For the reason of fiscal rules see International Monetary Fund,
supra and C.B. Blankart, ‘The European Union’s Debt Question: A
Conceptual Viewpoint’, Constitutional Political Economy 7 (1996).
14 Cicero 63 BC in G. Kopits. Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework
or Unnecessary Ornament? (IMF Working Paper 01/145, 2001), 3.
15 Kopits, supra n. 14, 4–5.
16 For the Union transparency is still a far cry. It has been said that
‘the EU’s budget and budgetary procedures are beyond Byzantine’
(T. King, An opaque EU budget cannot be defended,
EuropeanVoice, 11 Jun. 2014).
17 C.B. Blankart, The European Union’s Debt Question: A Conceptual
Viewpoint, Constitutional Political Economy 7 (1996) 257–265;
C.B. Blankart & C. Kirchner, The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An
Economic Analysis of Ways In and Out (CESifo Working Paper
989, 2003) 3.
18 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Title II,
Financial Provisions, Arts 199–206.
19 The budgetary power game can be described as a vetocracy: ‘as a
war of “red lines”, leaving all responsibility for achieving a coherent
outcome to selected “brokers”’ (G. Benedetto & S. Milio,
Conclusion: Budget Policy, Past Experience and the Future, in: G.
Benedetto & S. Milio, (eds), European Union Budget Reform
(Palgrave MacMillan 2012, 172); Cp. J. Schild, How to Shift the
EU’s Spending Priorities? The Multiannual Financial Framework
2007–2013 in perspective, J. of Eur. Public Policy, 15: 4, 531–549
(2008), 533.
20 Buchanan, supra n. 12, 213.
21 The effectiveness of fiscal rules are usually discussed under the
keyword ‘escape clauses’. K. Mause & F. Groeteke, ‘New
Constitutional “Debt Brakes” for Euroland? A Question of
Institutional Complementarity’, Constitutional Political Economy
23 (2012) 279–301.
22 Poterba, supra n. 11.
23 J. von Hagen & I.J. Harden, ‘Budget Processes and Commitment to
Fiscal Discipline’, European Economic Review 39 (1995) 771–779;
Debrun et al., supra n. 10; IMF, supra n. 14.
THE NEW LONG-TERM BUDGET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW EUROPEAN TAXES
56 EC TAX REVIEW 2015/1
rules do lead to improved performance, e.g., a stronger
cyclically adjusted primary balance. Fiscal rules also
increase the probability of more accurate budget
projections.24 A strong legal basis, however, of rules and
strict enforcement are important.
4 ASSESSMENT OF THE MFF PACKAGE
Has the very real rebalancing of the budgetary powers of
the EU institutions after the Lisbon Treaty in terms of
agenda-setting and vetoes changed the outcomes of the
decisions? 25
4.1 The Constitutionalization of the MFF
The constitutionalization of the MFF is one of the major
changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.26 It is about
the strongest commitment one can make about fiscal
sustainability. Since it requires a Treaty change, the MFF
can hardly be changed under tempting situations. There
is a real loss of flexibility. But how credible is this
commitment? There is no political-independent control.
There are no sanctions for rule breakers. 27 What is left
is naming-and-shaming: the new MFF maximizes the
reputational costs for those institutions that do not
respect it.
4.2 Flexibility
Though the MFF ensures stability, flexibility is needed to
cope with unforeseen needs. This can be done, e.g., by
increasing the flexibility instruments in number and/or
in terms of amount allocated, or to create more
flexibility in terms of easiness of procedures.28 Flexibility
became an issue in the negotiations over the new MFF.
The new IIA ‘on budgetary discipline, on cooperation
in budgetary matters and on sound financial
management’ (Article 259 TFEU) contains provisions
related to the flexibility instruments. It allows unused
margins (differences between the expenditure ceilings
and the money actually spent) as well as unused funds
(unused payment appropriations) to be transferred onto
the following year or to other parts of the budget.29
Flexibility is both on budgeted commitments and actual
payments. In short, the IIA ensures that available funds
are fully used rather than returned, as was previously
the case, to the Member States.
Next to the general instruments some specific
flexibility measures have been introduced. There is, e.g.,
a special flexibility for youth employment and research.
Without being limited by the annual expenditure
ceilings set by the MFF funds, money can be brought
forward (frontloading). Finally there is a last resort
instrument to react to unforeseen circumstances: a
general contingency margin which amounts to 0.03% of
the EU’s GNI.
4.3 Off Budget30
Just as state governments in the US use public
authorities to circumvent constitutional debt limits,31
the Union uses the European Investment Bank (EIB) as a
sort of financial intermediary. In the US the introduction
of fiscal restraints induced the engagement in off-budget
activities and authorities.32
For the Union the result is that some funds or
projects are left outside the MFF. These instruments are
available outside expenditure ceilings agreed in the MFF.
They are the Emergency Aid Reserve, European
Globalization Fund, Solidarity Fund, Flexibility
Instrument and the European Development Fund
(EDF).33 In short, though debt and/or an increase in
expenditures are prohibited in the budget, it is not
necessarily prohibited off-budget.34
Another off-budget payment is coming too. Though
for the first time the MFF was cut in real terms, the
actual result probably will be different. In general,
24 S. Luechinger & C.A. Schaltegger, ‘Fiscal Rules, Budget Deficits
and Budget Projections’, International Tax Public Finance 20,
785–807 (2013), 785.
25 For a discussion of legal changes between the old and the new
MFF see G. Benedetto, Budget Reform and the Lisbon Treaty, in: G.
Benedetto & S. Millio (Eds), supra. For an overview of the political
power game itself and the horse trading that went with it see
European Parliament, The battle for the EU’s long-term budget,
Focus (2013); Cp. E. Campanella, What Constitutional Fiscal Rule
for the Members of the EU? (VOX.EU 20 Feb. 2011).
26 The question, however, if a government really wants to be
constrained, since self-binding is the essence of constitution-
making, is an open question. Maybe it is just the other way
around: ‘[i]n politics, people never try to bind themselves, only to
bind others’ (J. Elster, Ulysses Unbound. Studies in Rationality,
Precommitment, and Constraints (Cambridge University Press
2000), ix.
27 Mause and Groeteke, supra n. 21.
28 E. Molino & F. Zuleeg, Key Political Messages Regarding the
Upcoming EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) post-2013
(European Policy Centre QG-32-13-074-EN-N, 2011), 15.
29 It is to be noted that the overall margin available under the own
resources ceiling for payment appropriations is already ‘used’ as
collateral for the outstanding amount of loans or credit lines
granted to Member States under the European financial stability
mechanism (B. Marzinotto, The Long-Term EU Budget: Size or
Flexibility?), Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2012/20,
November (2012), 6.
30 According to Art. 310 of the Treaty all items of revenue and
expenditures have to be entered into the budget. This is still a far
cry. Next to the just-mentioned funds, the EU budget acts as
‘collateral’ in a number of financial instruments, e.g., the European
Stability Mechanism, loan guarantees to small and medium
enterprises, and trust funds in development aid. It was the wish of
the EP that those post were to be included in the new MFF.
31 B.S. Bunch, ‘The Effect of Constitutional Debt Limits on State
Governments’ use of public authorities’, Public Choice 68: 57–69
(1991), 57. Cp. W. Easterly, When Is Fiscal Adjustment and
Illusion? The World Bank (Policy Research Working Paper 2109,
1999).
32 J. von Hagen, ‘A Note on the Empirical Effectiveness of Formal
Fiscal Restraints’, J. of Public Eco. 44: 199–210 (1991), 202; Cp.
J.T. Bennett & T. Dilorenzo, Underground Government: The Off-
budget Public Sector (Cato Institute, Washington 1983).
33 The EDF is also outside the MFF because Member States
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commitments (undertakings to pay) were cut by 3.4%
and payments by 3.7% that is 0.3% of EU-wide GNI.35
This gives an unusually large gap between these two
amounts. This can potentially cause problems down the
line. Probably the EP and the Commission think that, if
necessary, there will be a bail-out. Just as there were,
retroactively in 2013, so-called top-up funds necessary
and furnished by the Member States.
5 MID-TERM REVISION: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW EU
TAXES
Part of ‘the flexibility deal’ in the MFF package is a
revision clause of the existing MFF. In 2016, the Council
and newly elected EP and Commission have to reassess
the political priorities and figures allocated to
expenditure ceilings for the remaining years of the MFF.
Given the above assessment, the chances are great
that extra funds are needed. How will the problem be
solved during the mid-term review? Given that the
Member States have supplied top-up funds before, there
are no credible no-bailout signals. This certainly
weakens the politicians’ incentives to abide by the
intended budget balance in the MFF. Next to that, and
for this paper of the most importance, the Union has
some taxation autonomy and the introduction of new
EU taxes is, as the Joint Declaration on Own Resources
in the MFF package states, an explicit part of the mid-
term review.36 Given that top-up funds, giving extra
money to ‘Brussels’, are unpopular to the electorate of
the Member States, two new taxes: an FTT and an EU
VAT, proposed by the Commission and endorsed by the
EP, may be the way-out. Especially an FTT seems
opportune. The tax is presented as a way to let the
financial sector pay for its part in causing the 2008
financial crisis.37 It is called a fair, ‘Robin Hood’ tax; a
strategy that worked in the US In the US financial
institutions do have to pay record penalties.38 An FTT
also seems for the Member States to be the way to pay
for the coming gap in the budget.
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The MFF is the logical outcome of a development of a
Union focused on the creation of the single market to
one that is also devoted to finance redistributive
programs and (public) goods. Just fixing the existing
fiscal rules was no longer sufficient: institutional-
constitutional reform was needed.
With the new MFF, the first one under the Lisbon
Treaty, the EP got more power. As a result, the EP and
the Commission were an effective countervailing power
to the wish of the Council to curtail the budget. The
MFF was curtailed in name only – flexibility was the
name of the (power) game.
In the 2016 mid-term revision, the problem to
finance the needed extra funds will take prominence.
Given that new European taxes have to be decided too,
it is to be expected that they will have to fill the financial
gap. Given the experiences in the US, an FTT seems to
be the likely candidate.
35 In general the budget went down, the first net reduction in the
Union’s history, to 1% from 1.12% of the EU GNI.
36 Council, Addendum to ‘I/A’ Item Note (Brussels, 25 Nov. 2013).
37 European Commission, Commission Staff Working paper, SEC
(2011) 1103 final.
38 BofA Deal With US Is Hung Up Over Penalties Tied to
Countrywide, Merrill, Wall Street Journal, 28 Jul. (2014).
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